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This research investigates who is paying more for acquisitions, a public strategic investor or a 
private equity buyout fund. Furthermore, it investiga es for which factors the investor pays 
more. The data consist of 935 transactions in Europe. Using data from Europe is a main 
distinction between the often used data from America. It is found that a target shareholder 
selling its shares, gets on average a 64.49% higher price from a public strategic investor 
compared to a private equity fund. Furthermore, it is discovered that variables like the level of 
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Much research is only focusing on mergers and acquisitions1 of public operating companies 
(also called public strategic investors). Research about private equity firms (also known as 
private equity funds, private equity investors or financial sponsors) engaging in acquisitions is 
rare. As Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz and Zutter (2008) acknowledge it, although the press 
has devoted more attention to private acquirers, the academic research world has paid little 
attention to this type of acquire. One reason for this is likely the limited availability of 
information’s since most private equity firms provide less information than public listed 
companies do.  
However, private equity firms are a major player in the corporate control market, especially for 
mature firms (Wruck, 2008). Between 1970 and 2007 private equity firms have conducted 
17,171 leverage buyouts worldwide which had a total enterprise value of more than $3.6 trillion 
(in numbers: $3,600,000,000,000) according to estimates done by Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2009). One aim of this work is to bring more light into the field of how private equity functions 
and what they look for in a target company. Especially research will be conducted about what 
acquisition premium private equity firms are paying i  comparison to public strategic firms and 
private strategic firms. Furthermore, I want to investigate what makes an acquirer pay a higher 
premium. Thereby, the main research question to be investigated in this study is:  
Public strategic investor or private equity fund, who is paying more in an acquisition and 
for which factors is he paying more? 
One might argue that the operating companies are paying higher premiums due to the synergies 
they are, in contrast to private equity funds, able to gain. However, some research (e.g. 
Gorbenko and Malenko (2014)) suggest that this is not always the case. Also, Bergeron et al. 
(2008) show that synergies cannot be the only reason why operating companies should pay a 
                                                 
1 A Merger is the process of combining two companies to one. In an acquisition one company acquires 
the other and holds control of the two companies (Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2010). This paper will 




higher premium. Bergeron et al. (2008) investigate th  paid premium difference between 
strategic public companies, strategic private companies and private equity funds using data 
from acquisitions in the United States in the time from 1980 until 2005.  
This research will contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, it will bring 
more research into the question about who is paying more in an acquisition. And since most 
research is done with acquisitions in the United States, the here used data about targets in 
Europe will additionally answer the question of if there are major differences between this two 
geographies regarding acquisition premium paid. Secondly, since private equity funds are often 
discussed in public as well as from policy maker (Kosman, 2009) the understanding of what 
private equity is looking for in a target can bring more facts to this discussions. Knowing what 
a private equity fund or a strategic company is looking for in an acquisition can help 
shareholders when they want to sell their business. What is more, when they know who is 
paying more in an acquisition it can help them when they prepare for a sale process of the 
company. Alternatively, viewed in the opposite direction, it can help company executive 
directors to know what an acquirer is looking for in a company when they want (need) to prepare 
for a takeover defense strategy (when they do not want to get acquired by a corporation).   
The developed hypothesises will be analysed with different accounting figures from the target 
company (for example the EBITDA margin). The final s mple of transactions consists of 935 
acquisition events. A market model event study willbe used to calculate the abnormal returns. 
The main regression will be performed with the ordinary least square (OLS) regression. As a 
robustness check, other regression and analyses will be calculated.  
The structure of this research paper is as follows. Section 2 will present the literature review 
about mergers and acquisitions and acquisition premiums paid. Additionally, the hypothesises 
will be developed here. In section 3 the research design will be presented. Following section 3 
the results will be presented in section 4. The results from section 4 will be discussed in section 
5 and compared with the developed hypothesises in section 2. The last section, section 6 will 




2. Literature review  
2.1 Framework – What is meant by private equity? 
The concept of private equity2 firms will be discussed in more detail here. In the literature there 
are some different definitions about private equity, depending on what exactly is investigated 
and in what economies this investigation takes place. In general, private equity can be described 
as an asset class that is not publicly traded on a stock exchange. In more detail, Leeds and 
Sunderland (2003) define private equity as the process of providing financing to private 
companies in early- and later stages. The financing thereby comes from third-party investors 
who are looking for high returns based on the near-t rm illiquidity and the risk profiles of the 
private companies. The near-term illiquidity is a result of the fact that the investors in private 
equity have to commit the money for a longer period than they are used to on the stock 
exchange, where they can buy and sell their stock nearly every second (depending on the 
liquidity of the market). Prowse (1998) defines private equity as professionals who invest equity 
into unregistered securities of private as well as public companies. Prowse (1998) adds that 
private equity managers acquire significant ownership take and additionally take an active role 
in advising and monitoring the portfolio companies. These professionals are called general 
partners.  













                                                 
2 Throughout the research paper I mean private equity b yout funds when talking about private equity. 
Furthermore, I will use the terms private equity buyo t funds, private equity funds and private equity 





The figure shows the typical environment of a private equity leveraged buyout fund. Source: Own illustration 




Further explanations to the figure (the numbers refer to the circled numbers in the figure): 
(1) The general partner of the private equity fund is responsible for operating the fund, he is the 
fund manager and meant when talking about a private equity firm or fund. The fund has a typical 
length of 10 years, with often a possible extension of 3 years (Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009). 
Among others the general partner is responsible for fundraising, valuation and acquisition of 
target, planning of value creation initiatives, selling of the target (often with the help of 
consultants) (Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn and Sobczak, 2008). 
(2) Most of the capital comes from the limited partners who are institutional investors like 
insurance companies, pension funds, endowments and also wealthy individuals. At least 1% is 
provided by the general partner in order to have a higher alignment of interest (see for example 
Kaplan et al. (2009) and Sahlman (1990)). (3  As researched by Metrick and Yasuda (2010), 
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the general partner charges a management fee of around 2% annually. This fee is not dependent 
on the success of the fund. (4) After due diligence from the general partner the fund acquires 
target companies. Thereby the fund uses in general a substantial amount of debt, as Kaplan et 
al. (2009) write, a transaction is often executed with around 60 to 90 percent of debt. However, 
Kaplan et al. (2009) mainly talk about the market in the United States. Achleitner, Braun, Engel, 
Figge and Tappeiner (2010) investigate a data sample from European transactions and find that 
the level of debt is in the beginning at around 56.5% to 61.5% and is reduced doing the holding 
period to around 44.4% to 50%. (5) As mentioned in “(1)” the General Partner often supports 
the target management with the planning of value creation initiatives or advises them doing the 
execution of an add-on acquisition (Brettel et al., 2008). (6) When the target company gets sold 
to, for example a public strategic investor, the private equity fund gets the realised proceeds. 
(7) After the ten years (with maybe around 3 extra years) when the target companies are 
successfully sold the money is return to the investors. Often the so called waterfall is agreed on 
and used in order to distribute the money. Thereby, the limited partners will first of all receive 
their invested money back. Following this the limited partners regularly get an annually 
preferred return (also called hurdle rate) of 8%. If after this there is still money left, the general 
partner will get its profit share (also called carry) of mostly around 20% of the capital left. The 
remaining 80% is for the limited partners (see for example Robinson and Sensoy (2013)).  
2.2 What do we know? – A review of the literature  
2.2.1 Review of the acquisition premium literature  
Most of the research done about the acquisition premium is made with acquisitions data from 
the American market (at least the target is from America). That is the result of the extensive 
literature study I made. The acquisitions data used in this research paper are from the European 
market and thereby will help to understand the possible difference between the American 
market and the European market.  
Starting the literature review with research done in 1989 Nathan and O’Keefe (1989) find that 
the mean cash merger premium rose from the 1963-197 period from 29% to 70% in the 1974-
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1985 period. The premiums are measured by dividing the offered share price minus the target's 
share price (60 days prior the announcement day) by the target's share price (again 60 days 
before the announcement day). They control for a stuctural shift and business cycles and find 
that there is a definite positive time trend in takeover premiums. The sample size counts 681 
takeovers. The takeovers are from the period 1963-1985. The target as well as the acquirer are 
from the United States.     
The results of the acquisition premium will depend on the method about how the premium is 
calculated. Research done by Sudarsanam and Sorwar (2010) uses thereby a different method 
than the often used calculation of the CARs (cumulative abnormal returns)3. They argue that 
the target shareholder revaluates the company as a standalone company when they receive an 
offer for their shares (from the acquiring company). This, as Sudarsanam et al. (2010) call it, 
intrinsic value accounts for 14.4% of the premium. The value of the put option contributes 8.2% 
to the offered premium. The put is calculated with the Black-Scholes option pricing model and 
represents the option of the target shareholders to sell their stock to the acquiring company. The 
sample represents 181 successful acquisitions. The sample period is 1990-2004 and only 
represents acquisitions in cash done in the United Kingdom. Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) 
find by using an event window of only -1 to +1 a CAR of 22.51% (significant at the 1% level) 
for a sample size of 356 acquisitions. The sample period spans the years from 1980 until 1995. 
The targets are all located in the United States.  
2.2.2 Review of literature about strategic and financi l investors and the premium paid  
In the prior section I showed some example research done about the acquisition premium paid 
by strategic investors. This section shows the research done which includes financial investors 
in the investigations about acquisition premium paid. Again, as in the prior section, the review 
of an extensive amount of research reveals that most of the research is done with using 
acquisition targets in the United States.  
                                                 
3 For an explanation about how the CAR is calculated, s e appendix 2 
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The fact that the strategic investor can gain, different to the financial investor, synergies with 
an acquisition, can lead to a too early conclusion that the premium paid by a strategic investor 
is higher than the premium paid by a financial investor. However, Gorbenko et al. (2014) find 
that this is not true in general. They use a sample of 349 acquisitions which occurred in between 
January 1, 2000 and September 6, 2008. The acquisition processes were all done via an auction, 
meaning that there were multiple bidders for one spcific target company. 211 auctions were 
won by a strategic investor and 138 by a financial investor. However, they find that the average 
financial investor is valuing 22.4% of the target higher than an average strategic investor. 
Interestingly, they discover that the financial investor value the targets with substantial negative 
cash flows higher than a strategic investor. They argue that this can come from the financial 
investors having higher expertise in restructuring a company or better access to debt financing 
compared to the strategic investors. The argument of better access to debt financing can be 
supported by the findings of Ivashina and Kovner (2011) who find that the repeated interaction 
between banks and financial investors leads to favorable loan terms. Additionally, Demirogul 
and James (2010) find that reputable financial investors pay narrower institutional and bank 
loan spreads.  
Another study investigating acquisitions in the United States is done by Bargeron et al. (2008). 
They use a sample of 1,667 deals whereby 1,214 of this acquisitions are done by a strategic 
investor and 453 by a private company (combining a private operating company and a private 
equity firm). They argue that the premium differenc paid between private equity and public 
strategic investor is lowest when the managerial ownership in the public company is high and 
highest when the managerial ownership is low. The inv stigated acquisitions occurred between 
1980 and 2005 in the United States. Bargeron et al. (2008) find with an event window of -1 to 
+1 (0 being the announcement day) that a private equity bidder offers a premium of 20.6%, a 
private operating firm 23.6% and a strategic investor 29.5%. Bargeron et al. (2008) also 
calculate a Fama-French size and book-to-market portfoli -adjusted buy-and-hold return from 
-42 days to the completion date. Here the private equity, private operating firm and strategic 
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investor offer 28.5%, 40.9% and 46.5% respectively. This shows the sensitivity of the premium 
paid, depending on how it is calculated.   
Investigating the sale of assets, Hege, Lovo, Slovin and Sushka (2013) find that Private equity 
firms pay on average a premium of 3.8% at a two-day CAR (-1,0) event window. The sample 
size consist of 146 acquisitions by private equity, 287 strategic investor and 48 private operating 
investor acquisitions. The acquisitions are reported assets sales with a value of $100 million or 
more from public traded companies on the NYSE, ASE or Nasdaq. The strategic investors pay 
a premium of 1.3% and the private operating investor only pay a 1.0% premium. 
2.3 What is the investor paying for? 
In order to answer this question, it is important to know the economic theories which suggest 
under what conditions an investor should pay a higher premium. The hypothesises to test will 
be developed based on the literature review and economic theories.  
 
Operating free cash flow 
In general operating free cash flow is an important figure to be considered in the valuation of a 
company. It determines how much money a company is earning with its operations.  
Companies with high operating free cash flows but only a few profitable investment opportunity 
are particularly attractive to private equity funds. This is due to agency cost of free cash flow, 
as described by Jensen (1986). When the management of the company has access to high free 
cash flows but not enough obviously profitable investment opportunities the management might 
rather invest it in unprofitable opportunities than return it back to its shareholders. The 
reasoning behind this is that the management wants to increase the resources under its control 
to increase its compensation. Private equity investors can, as Bargeron et al. (2008) describes 
it, provide an organisational structure (e.g. alignme t of interest) were these problems are less 
likely. Therefore the first hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 1: A high operating cash flow of the target leads to a high premium paid  
by the acquirer  
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Thereby the operating free cash flow is calculated as: Net Income + Depreciation & 
Amortization + Other Noncash Adjustments + Changes in Non-cash Working Capital 
 
Market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s q 
The market-to-book ratio puts the value of the company, calculated by the market (market 
value) in comparison to the book value of equity of the company. Among others, Piotroski and 
So (2012) describe firms with a high market-to-book value as “glamour” firms. Firms with a 
low market-to-book value are called “value” firms. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) for example use 
the market-to-book ratio (they calculate it as a book-to-market ratio) to investigate the bidder's 
performance after a merger. They find evidence that glamour acquirers underperform after an 
acquisition. Additionally, Fidrmuc, Roosenboom, Paap nd Teunissen (2012) find that private 
equity investors pursue targets that have a lower ma ket-to-book ratio relative to targets 
acquired by strategic investors. 
A high Tobin’s q is regularly associated with companies with strong growth opportunities 
whereas companies with low growth opportunities are mostly companies with a low Tobin’s q. 
However, generally speaking, empirical research show  that the value firms outperform the 
market (Graham and Dodd, 1934; Rosenberg, Reid and L stein, 1985; Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994). Regarding the acquisition premium paid, there is for example Servaes 
(1991) who finds that the premium paid to the target is higher when the target has a low Tobin’s 
q. Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989) come to the same conclusion. One explanation available in 
the literature for this findings is that the acquirer can create more value (increase Tobin’s q) 
when Tobin’s q is low at the time of the acquisition and therefore he can pay a higher price 
(Lang et al., 1989).   
To investigate these findings further, the second hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 2: A low market to book value of the target explains a high acquisition  
premium paid 
Hypothesis 2 is measured with the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
and additionally measured with Tobin’s q ratio. 
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Tobin’s q is computed as: (Market Capitalisation + Total Liabilities + Preferred Equity + 
Minority Interest) / Total Assets.  
Debt-to-capital ratio 
The level of debt (also called leverage ratio or leverage) of the target is a major factor for the 
acquiring firm when valuing the target. As already mentioned, a high free cash flow can 
increase the agency cost since the management might invest the money in unprofitable 
businesses (Jensen, 1986). A high level of debt, by contrast, is reducing the free cash flow due 
to the higher interest and principal payments. However, a greater level of debt increases risk 
since the interest and principals need to be paid.  
For a strategic acquirer who wants to buy a company to gain synergies, Slusky and Caves (1991) 
found that the possibility to provide a target, which currently has a high level of debt, with an 
equity infusion can realise more value creation tha t e realisation of operational synergies can. 
A low leverage ratio can also be attractive for a pivate equity investor. First of all, the investor 
can increase the level of debt and therefore use cheap debt instead of expensive equity to finance 
the operations of the business. By doing this, the private equity investor makes use of the 
leverage effect (Nissim and Penman (2003) for example). Second of all, he can use the 
mentioned problem of having high free cash flows and align the interest between the 
management and the investors. Obviously, the value creation opportunities are greater if the 
debt was low before the acquisition. Therefore the third hypothesis is:     
 
Hypothesis 3: A low debt-to-capital ratio of the target explains a high acquisition  
premium paid 
The debt-to-capital ratio is calculated as:   Debt (as short- and long-term debt) / (Debt + Market 
Value of Equity) as well as with: Debt / (Debt + Book Value of Equity) 
 
Level of cash 
Private equity investors use the level of cash as one regulating screw to create value. As Pozen 
(2007) describes it, it is one of the hallmarks of private equity to keep the level of cash at the 
minimum. A target with a high level of cash can therefore be attractive for the private equity 
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investor due to the following reasons. First of all, s described by Lehn and Poulsen (1989), the 
private equity investor can make the acquired company pay out the cash. This will lead to an 
increase in the performance measure IRR (internal rate of return). Since the IRR is one of the 
most used measures for the performance of a private equity fund (e.g. Harris, Jenkinson and 
Kaplan, 2014) the private equity investor will most likely use this opportunity.  
In order to investigate the attractiveness of a high level of cash further, the fourth hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 4: A high level of cash on the balance sheet explains  high acquisition  
premium paid by the acquirer 
The level of cash is calculated as: Cash and near cash items / Total Assets 
EBITDA margin 
The EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation) margin is an 
important ratio to determine the performance and profitability of a company. Furthermore, in 
the multiple valuation method the EBITDA-multiple plays an important role. Especially private 
equity investor relay to a certain extent on the EBITDA-multiple when valuing a target 
company (see for example Pearl and Rosenbaum (2013), Pignataro (2013) as well as Ernst and 
Häcker (2012)). A survey done by Gompers, Kaplan and Mukharlyamov (2015) also reveals 
that 70% of the surveyed private equity investor use the EBITDA-multiple valuation to value a 
target.  
Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 5: A high EBITDA margin explains a high acquisition premium paid by  
the acquirer 
The EBITDA margin is calculated as: EBITDA / Revenu 
 
Interest rates in the economy 
Haddad, Loualiche and Plosser (2011) find that the number of leverage buyouts are positively 
correlated to the risk-free rate and high when the risk premium is low. Axelson, Jenkinson, 
Strömberg and Weisbach (2013) also find that the economy-wide credit conditions is a main 
driver of the level of leverage in a private equity transaction. This means, when credit is widely 
available (cheap) private equity investor use a lot of debt. Furthermore, they find that the 
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premium paid is higher when leverage is elevated in a transaction. They suggest that private 
equity investors overpay when debt is cheap since the return decreases in such transactions. 
Similar results are found by Demiroglu and James (2010), they find that reputable private equity 
investors are more active when credit risk spreads are low and lending standards are lax. In 
order to investigate if low interest rates in the debt market lead to higher acquisition premium 
the sixth hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 6: An acquirer pays a higher premium when the interest rates in the  
economy are low 
The interest rate in the economy is measured as: LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) 3-
month prior the acquisition announcement 
Size of the target 
The size of the acquired target is obviously an important factor when considering to acquire a 
company. For the strategic investor a larger company could mean more synergies but it also 
means that the effort to gain the synergies could be higher. Research done by Asquith, Bruner 
and Mullins (1983) showed that the strategic investor had an abnormal return which is 
positively correlated to the size of the target, meaning as larger the target, as larger the abnormal 
return to the strategic investor. Additional research is done by Servaes (1991) and Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1989) who all find that the value created for the acquirer is larger if the target is relative 
larger. This research might inspire strategic investor to acquire relative large companies and 
thereby increase the premium paid. The seventh hypot esis is:  
Hypothesis 7: An acquirer pays a higher premium when the target is larger  
The size of the target is measured as: natural log of the total announce transaction value of the 
target three months before the acquisition announcement.    
 
All these hypotheses will be tested by using public takeovers. This obviously leads to a 
limitation of the result found since many takeovers a e done where the target is not a public 
listed company. However, the information needed to test the hypotheses are best available for 
public takeovers. This is also consistent with other research, e.g. Bargeron et al. (2008).  
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3. Research Design   
This sections purpose is to describe the data gathering process and the data sample. At the 
beginning, I will give an overview of where I got the data from and what criteria were used to 
get the acquisition events. Furthermore, the data ghering of the individual variables will be 
explained.  
3.1 Data Sample 
The full and cleaned sample size consist of 534 acquisition events done by a strategic public 
investor, 254 acquisition events done by a strategic private investor and 147 events done by a 
private equity investor. The overall sample size is therefore 935 acquisition events which 
occurred in the time from 06th of January 1998 until 23rd of December 2015. 
The acquisition events come from the Bloomberg M&A database. For completeness and as 
cross check, the M&A database Zephyr from Bureau van Dijk was also checked. The events 
had to meet the following criteria to be included in the data sample:  
• Europe as the targets location  
• Target need to be a public listed company (to get all necessary informations) 
• Transaction need to be completed until the end of 2015 (to make sure the premium is paid) 
• Cash-only transactions (for comparability, t  his is consistent with Bargeron et al. (2008)) 
• 100% of the company need to be acquired and the acquirer need to hold 0% before the 
acquisition (again to make the premiums paid comparable)  
• Deals which have a target which is not an operating company are excluded 
Appendix 1 provides an exemplary breakdown of the seps undertaken to end up with the final 
private equity investor data sample.  
3.2 Dependent and independent variables  
The data for the dependent and independent variables re mainly from Bloomberg but also from 
sources like Datastream. The data sources and individual data are examined carefully to get the 
right data. In the following the calculation and source of each independent variable is explained: 
Dependent variable: The dependent variable will be the cumulative abnormal return from 63-
trading days prior the announcement to the announcement day (CAR -63 ; 0). The CAR will be 
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calculated with an event study. The stock returns ae from Bloomberg. Other event windows, 
e.g. 42 days prior (CAR -42 ; 0) acquisition announcement are also computed and investigated.      
Operating free cash flow: The operating free cash flow is obtained from Bloomberg. 
Bloomberg obtained the numbers from the annual report of the specific target. The annual report 
one year prior the acquisition announcement is used. As an example: when the acquisition was 
announced at the beginning of July 2012, the annual report of 2011 (with financial year ending 
in December 2011) is used. However, the numbers need to be published at least three months 
before the acquisition announcement. This means, if the announcement is made right after the 
annual report is published, the annual report used i  one before this recently released report. 
The argumentation for this is that the performed due iligence of the acquirer is done some 
month before the announcement. This means that the acquirer can only use the numbers 
available at that time (although he will probably get access to non-publicly information later in 
the acquisition process). Market-to-book ratio: The numbers for the market to book ratio are 
also obtained from Bloomberg. The market value of equity is calculated by the current shares 
outstanding times the last price of the day. As with the operating free cash flow, Bloomberg 
obtains the numbers of shares outstanding from the annual report prior the announcement. The 
stock price is from the same day as the number of current shares outstanding. The market value 
of equity is divided by the book value of equity. Tobin’s q: It is obtained from Bloomberg. 
Again with numbers from one annual report prior the announcement. Debt-to-capital ratio: The 
debt-to-capital ratio is also obtained from Bloomberg. Level of cash: Cash and near cash items 
divided by total assets determine the level of cash. The numbers are obtained from Bloomberg. 
EBITDA margin: The EBITDA margin is calculated as EBITDA divided by revenue and from 
Bloomberg at the same point in time as the other numbers. Interest rates in the economy: The 
interest rate in the economy are measured by the three month LIBOR (London Interbank 
Offered Rate) three month prior the acquisition announcement. The LIBOR is obtained from 
Bloomberg. Size of the target: The size of the target is measured as the natural log market value 
three months prior the acquisition announcement. The three month (63 trading days) before the 
acquisition announcement are chosen to make sure that the market value is not affected by any 
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anticipation (e.g. insider trading) of the acquisition. This is consistent with Bargeron et al. 
(2008) for example.  
In the main regression are two dummy variables included. One is a dummy variable which 
equals one if it is a private equity investor and zero otherwise. The other dummy variable 
indicates if it is a private strategic (operating) investor with a one and zero otherwise. 
Additionally, there are dummies for the first four years after the financial crisis 2008.  
3.3 Event Study  
In order to measure the premium paid (which will be th  dependent variable) an event study is 
performed. The event study is necessary to incorporate any possible pre-bid runup due to, for 
example, insider trading or other anticipation of the acquisition announcement.  What is meant 
by this is that insiders or other investors might ge informed about the upcoming acquisition 
announcement and therefore trade the stock of the targ t only based on that information. As 
Schwert (1996) showed, before an acquisition announcement of a public traded company, the 
stock price increases abnormal which he calls pre-bid runup.  In order to get the “real” premium, 
the investor is willing to pay, the cumulative abnormal returns are calculated. This is consistent 
with many other studies like Bargeron et al. (2008), Graham et al. (2002) and Boone and 
Mulherin (2011). 
Similar to Brown and Warner (1980) an event day needs to be defined. In this study the event 
day will be the day of the announcement of an acquisition by an investor. A detailed explanation 
of the calculations behind the performed event study and the test for significance in the 






4.1 Descriptive statistic about the dependent variables  
Table 1 below shows the returns which the shareholdrs of the acquired target got when they 
were acquired either by a private equity fund, a private strategic investor or a public strategic 
investor. This returns are a measure of the acquisition premium paid by the respective acquirer. 
As can be seen in Panel A in the first row the averg  CAR63 (cumulative abnormal return 63 
days before and until acquisition announcement) is 25.01% for the shareholder of a target who 
is acquired by a private equity fund. Compared to that, if a public strategic investor acquires a 
target the average CAR63 is 41.14%. This finding is fa cinating. It means that a target 
shareholder who gets and offer for its shares, gets on average a 64.49% (calculated as: 41.14% 
/ 25.01% - 1) higher price for them if the offer comes from a public strategic investor compared 



















Premium paid by different acquirers  
This table presents the calculated average and median abnormal returns using different event windows and
methods. The CAR63 is the cumulative abnormal return from 63-trading days prior the acquisition announcement 
to the announcement day. The CAR42 is the cumulative bnormal return from 42-trading days prior the acquisition 
announcement to the announcement day.  The DP3 is the stock price of the target on the announcement day divided 
by the stock price three trading days before (withou  any other adjustments). The DP63 is the stock price of the 
target on the announcement day divided by the stock pri e 63 trading days before. The average and median is 
calculated for all results. The p-value states the significance level which is calculated by a t-test for the average 





The CAR42 in table 1 shows a similar picture. The pr mium paid by the private strategic 
investor (middle column of Panel A) is interestingly for all measured premiums higher than the 
premium paid by the private equity fund but lower than the premium paid by the public strategic 
investor. This leads to the conjecture that the explanation that, a public strategic investor is 
paying a higher premium compared to a private equity f nd because he can gain synergies, 
can’t be the only reason. This is because a private strategic investor is paying a lower price, 
despite the fact that he can also gain synergies. Further analysis regarding DP3 and DP63 can 
be found in appendix 3.  
Summarizing the results seen in Table 1 the public strategic investors definitely pay the highest 
premium whereas the private equity funds pay the lowest premium. When a shareholder with a 
significant shareholding (up to 100%) in a public listed company thinks about selling his shares, 
the results presented above have a clear suggestion. The shareholder should approach a public 
strategic investor as the buyer of his shares.   
4.2 Descriptive statistics about the independent variables 
After discussing the descriptive statistic of the acquisition premium paid (dependent variables) 
in the previews section, the descriptive statistic of the independent variable will be the topic of 
this section.  
As can be seen in table 2 in panel A the TOBINS_Q for targets acquired by public acquirer is 
higher (average of 1.6428, median of 1.3731) than te one for the targets acquired by private 
acquirer (average of 1.3120, median of 1.1236). This means that public acquirers are more 
attractive to “glamour” companies as compared to private acquirers which acquirer more 
“value” firms.  This is also found in the sample investigated by Bargeron et al. (2008).  
The variable Ofcf/BV_of_Assets (calculated as explained in section “2.3 What is the investor 
paying for?”) provides information about the targets cash flow. Panel A shows that private 
acquirer buy companies with a higher cash flow than public acquirer (private acquirer: average 
of 0.0653, median of 0.0693 and public acquirer: aver ge of 0.0594, median of 0.0525). Panel 
B shows that private equity investors look for companies with higher cash flow than private 
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strategic acquirer do (private equity investor: aver g  of 0.0743, median of 0.0798 compared 
to private strategic acquirer: average of 0.0601, median of 0.0618). This finding provides 
evidence for the findings mentioned before. Private equity acquirer can create value by an 
alignment of interest (decreasing the agency cost as explained by Jensen (1986)) between the 
owner of the company and the CEO. By doing so, theyreturn the cash flow to the owners of 
the company.  
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics about the independent variables   
This table shows the average and the median [in brakets] of selected independent variables. The variables are 
calculated as explained in section 2.3. The p-value states the significance level which is calculated by a t-test for 




The Debt/MV_of_Eq+D and the Debt/MV_of_Eq+D in Panel B for the targets acquired by 
private equity investors is relatively high. An explanation for this could be provided by Ivashina 
et al. (2011). As already mentioned, they find evidnce that private equity funds get more 
favourable loan terms at banks since they have a repeating interaction. Therefore, a way for a 
private equity fund to create value for the acquired company might be to exchange the old loans 
for new loans with better terms.  
As can be seen in the table when looking at the variable size (which here is measured as the 
total value of the target 63 days prior the acquisition announcement), private acquirer takeover 
smaller firms than public acquirer.  
4.3 Regression models  
Four main models are used for the regression analyses. Model (1) is the standard model and 
includes the independent variables discussed in section 2.3 and also a dummy which indicates 
a private equity fund and a dummy which indicates a private operating acquirer. Model (2) 
additionally includes a dummy variable for the years 2008 until 2015. Model (3) includes 
dummies for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 whereas model (4) includes dummies for the years 
2010, 2011 and 2012. This is done in order to investigate if there are major difference in the 
years doing and after the financial crisis. In order to make sure that the models are statistically 
working without any mistake I investigated some assumption of the OLS (ordinary least square) 
regressions. Thereby I followed Brooks (2014). I checked for multicollinearity by calculating 
correlation coefficients as well as the variance inflation factors. There is no multicollinearity in 
the models and therefore no adjustments for this are needed.  
4.4 Research results 
This section will present the results of the models. Purpose of the performed regressions is to 
understand in more detail for what factors or accounting numbers the acquirers are paying a 





Results in table 3 
As can be seen in table 3 the dummy variable for the acquisitions by private equity funds, 
PE_dummy and the dummy variable for the acquisitions by private strategic investors, 
Private_str._dummy are significant (at 1% level, indicated by three “***”) and negative for all 
models. This means that there is a difference between private equity fund, private operating 
investor and public operating investor in terms of acquisition premium paid. As with the results 
discussed in Section 4.1 this results provide evidence that private acquirer pay a lower premium. 
According to model (1), holding everything else consta t, private equity funds pay a 15.64% 
lower premium compared to public acquirer (as can be read from the coefficient PE_dummy in 
model (1)). Including the Y2008-2015_dummy variable in model (2) reviles that the financial 
crisis led to a change in the results. The variable is statistically significant at the 5% level and 
the coefficient is 0.08151, meaning that the premium paid doing and after 2008 are 8.15% 
higher than before 2008. Dummy variable Y2008_dummy and Y2009_dummy in model (3) are 
both positive and significant at the 10% level (Y2008_dummy) and 1% level (Y2009_dummy). 
Especially Y2009_dummy is with a coefficient of 0.24708 pretty high and reveals that the 
premium paid in 2009 was the main driver for higher premiums post financial crisis. An 
explanation for this results could be that the price the acquirers paid for a company was not that 
high when considering the price the company was traded at some years before. However, the 
acquisition premiums were high because stock prices in 2008 and 2009 were low. 
Furthermore, for all models (1 to 8) the independent variable TOBINS_Q is significant at the 
1% level. What is more, the coefficient is always negative leading to the conclusion that an 
increase in the TOBINS_Q leads to a decrease in the acquisition premium paid. An explanation 
for this might be that an acquirer is not willing to pay an even higher price for a company that 











Multiple regression analysis with CAR63 and CAR42 
This table shows eight ordinary least square (OLS) regression models. The dependent variable in model (1) to 
model (4) is the CAR63 (cumulative abnormal return from 63-trading days prior the acquisition announcement to 
the announcement day). The dependent variable for model (5) to model (8) is the CAR42 (cumulative abnormal 
return from 42-trading days prior the acquisition an ouncement to the announcement day). The other variables are 
calculated as explained in section 2.3. All dummies are equal to one if the acquisition occurred in the respective 
year e.g. Y2007_dummy is one in 2007. Coefficients denoted with ***, ** or *, are significant at the 1%, 5% or 
10% level, respectively.  
 
Interestingly, as can be seen in table 3, the EBITDA_margin is statistically insignificant for all 
models. Neither with the CAR63 or with the CAR42 investor seem to react much differently to 
a higher or lower EBITDA margin. Different to what was expected, the Ofcf/BV_to_Assets 
variable provides statistically significant evidenc that a high operating free cash flow leads to 
a reduction in the premium paid (all models significant at the 1% level).  
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The Cash/Asset variable also shows interesting results. All models return statistically 
significant results at the 1% level. For model (1) the coefficient is 0.25992 meaning that 
acquirers pay a 25.99% higher premium. That a high level of cash attracts acquirer and makes 
them pay high premiums is also found by other research studies (e.g. Gorbenko et al., 2014 and 
Fidrmuc et al., 2012). The adjusted_R² in table 3 is in all models above 8.00%, and is the highest 
in model (7) with 10.70%.    
 
Results in table 4 
As can be seen in table 4 the PE_dummy and the Private_str._dummy are statistically significant 
at the 1% level for all eight models. This leads to the conclusion that the premium paid by a 
private company (no matter if operating investor or private equity fund) is different from the 
premium paid by a public company even when calculating “normal” 3-days and 63-days 
premium without any adjustments. The premium paid by a private equity fund is again lower 
than the premium paid by a private operating investor in all eight models. Including the dummy 
variable Y2008-2015_dummy again reveals that the financial crisis had an impact on the 
premium paid. The dummy is significant at the 1% leve  and has a coefficient of 0.11938.  
Looking at TOBINS_Q in table 4 the results are similar as in table 3. For all models, the 
coefficients are negative confirming that an increase in Tobin’s q leads to a lower premium paid 
by an acquirer.  
Also as in table 3 all models return that the EBITDA_margin is statistically not significant. 
Proofing further that investors do not pay high attention to a targets EBITDA margin when 
determining what premium to pay. Interesting results are found when looking at the 
Ofcf/BV_to_Assets variable. When regressing it on the DP3 the results are statistically 
insignificant. This is different to the significant results found when using the CAR63, CAR42 
or the DP63 as the dependent variable. It should be noted that the coefficients for 






Multiple regression analysis with DP3 and DP63 
This table shows eight ordinary least square (OLS) regression models. The dependent variable in model (1) to 
model (4) is the DP3 (normal return from 3-trading days prior the acquisition announcement to the annou cement 
day). The dependent variable for model (5) to model (8) is the DP63 (normal return from 63-trading days prior the 
acquisition announcement to the announcement day). The other variables are calculated as explained in section 
2.3. All dummies are equal to one if the acquisition occurred in the respective year e.g. Y2007_dummy is one in 
2007. Coefficients denoted with ***, ** or *, are significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.  
 
Furthermore, having significant results at the 1% leve  in all DP63 models it can be concluded 
that an increase in the operating free cash flow has negative impact on the premium paid. 
Different to what was found in table 3 the independent variable LIBOR is significant in five out 
of the eight models in table 4. In model (1) in table 4 the LIBOR coefficient is -0.01262 implying 
that an increase in the LIBOR leads to a 1.26% reduction in the acquisition premium paid. This 
is consistent with the research found by, for example at al. (2013) and Demiroglu et al. (2010) 
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(mentioned already in section 2.3) who find especially for the private equity investor’s that they 
increase their acquisition activity in a time of low interest rates. This means that doing periods 
of high interest rates private equity investors decrease acquisition activity which leads to lower 
acquisition premiums due to lower demand. The adjusted R²’s for all the models (apart from 
model (2) which has an adjusted R² of 8.70%) are lower than any model in the previously 
discussed results (table 3). Which indicates that it is advisable to take abnormal returns instead 
of non-adjusted “normal” returns as dependent variables. This will result in better fitted models. 
Additionally, to the presented results in this section I perform robustness checks (appendix 4 to 
appendix 7) to strengthen the results. I use a winsorized regression (Wilcox, 2009) and thereby 
follow for example, Huang (2009) and Minton, Schrand and Walther (2002) by winsorizing at 
the 1st and 99th percentile. Furthermore, I perform a quantile regression, using the 50th quantile. 
The method was first developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978). By using the quantile 
regression as a robustness check of the results I follow Bargeron et al. (2008). Overall, the 
robustness checks confirm the previously described results.  
5. Discussion  
In section „2.3 What is the investor paying for?” I developed seven hypothesises based on an 
extensive literature review. This hypothesises were further investigated in chapter “4. Results”. 
The aim of this section is to relate the findings of the performed regressions in chapter four to 
the hypothesises and to decide if a hypothesis is to be confirmed, contradicted or if there is no 
statement possible due to the insignificance of the variable in the performed regression models. 
 
Hypothesis 1: A high operating cash flow of the target leads to a high premium paid 
by the acquirer. 
The performed regressions provide a pretty clear statement regarding the operating free cash 
flow of the target. For CAR63 and CAR42 all performed regression contradict the hypothesis 
with strong significance. For the DP3 there is no significance in the results. For DP63 all but 
the quantile regression (robustness check) provide proof, with a significance level of 1%, for 
contradicting the hypothesis. The results are interesting and mean that an acquirer pays a lower 
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premium for a company with high cash flows. Furthermo e, the findings from Bargeron et al. 
(2008), who find that private equity investors acquire targets with higher cash flows compared 
to the targets pursuit by public strategic acquirer, were confirmed. Private equity investors 
however, acquirer targets with a higher operating cash flow than public strategic investors do, 
as can be seen in table 2. This strengthens the results found by researcher who argue that private 
equity investor can create value by reducing the agency cost of free cash flow. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A low market to book value of the target explains a high acquisition  
premium paid 
For the TOBINS_Q there is a clear statement possible for CAR63, CAR42, DP3 and DP63. 
The hypothesis can be confirmed. For the market-to-bo k ratio there were mostly not significant 
results found, which means there is no clear statement possible. However, the strong results for 
the TOBINS_Q lead to the overall conclusion that the ypothesis can be confirmed. 
Additionally, the results from table 2 show that private equity investors acquire targets with a 
lower TOBINS_Q and market-to-book ratio than the public strategic investors.  
 
Hypothesis 3: A low debt-to-capital ratio of the target explains a high acquisition  
premium paid 
This hypothesis can only be confirmed with limitations. The Debt/BV_of_Eq+D variable 
confirms the hypothesis for CAR63. For CAR42 there is no significance in the results. The 
Debt/MV_of_Eq+D uses, as explained, the market value of equity instead of the book value of 
equity as the Debt/BV_of_Eq+D does. According to the results provided by Debt/MV_of_Eq+D 
the hypothesis needs to be contradicted for CAR63, CAR42 and DP63 with significant results. 
DP3 is insignificant. However, the nature of the variable is such that, if the market value of 
equity is relatively low, it is more likely that the premium paid is higher than if the market value 
of equity is already high. A low market value of equity increases the level of debt in this variable 
and likely also the premium paid. Therefore, the variable could be more driven by the market 
value of equity than the level of debt. As such, I relate more weight to the variable 
Debt/BV_of_Eq+D to answer if this hypothesis can be confirmed. It follows, that the hypothesis 
can only be confirmed without limitation for CAR63. 
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Private equity investors acquire targets with a higher level of debt than public strategic investor 
do. A reason for this is provided by Ivashina et al. (2011) who argues that private equity 
investors get more favourable loan terms than public strategic investors get and therefore can 
create some value.  
 
Hypothesis 4: A high level of cash on the balance sheet explains  high acquisition  
premium paid by the acquirer 
A high level of cash on the balance sheet definitely increases the acquisition premium paid. 
This is confirmed by all main regressions for CAR63, CAR42, DP3 and DP63 with mostly 
statistically significance at the 1% level. The hypothesis can therefore be confirmed. 
Additionally, table 2 shows that public strategic acquirer takeover targets with a higher level of 
cash than private equity investor do. Manager who don’t want that there company gets acquired 
by an investor should therefore keep the level of cash on the balance sheet as low as possible. 
 
Hypothesis 5: A high EBITDA margin explains a high acquisition premium paid by  
the acquirer 
The main regressions for this hypothesis provided no significant results. Only for both 
robustness checks the results are significant (for all four ways of premium calculated), but the 
coefficients are only slightly different from zero. Since the coefficients from the robustness 
checks are negative the hypothesis needs to be contradicted. However, as said, the coefficients 
are so small negative that an increase in the EBITDA margin will only decrease the premium 
paid slightly.   
The EBITDA margin of the targets acquired by private equity investors is much higher than the 
margin of the targets acquired by public strategic investors (as can be seen in table 2).  
 
Hypothesis 6: An acquirer pays a higher premium when the interest rates in the  
economy are low 
In order to investigate this hypothesis the LIBOR was used. For the main regression with the 
premium calculated with CAR63 and CAR42 there are only insignificant results. Using the 
robustness check the outcome changes in the way that there is some significance providing 
evidence that the premium paid decreases when the LIBOR increases (also the coefficients are 
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only slightly below zero). For the premium calculated with DP3 and DP63 there is some 
evidence in the main models and in the robustness checks that an increase in the LIBOR 
decreases the premium paid. Overall it can be concluded that the premium paid is lower when 
the interest rates in the economy (here measured as LIBOR) are high. The hypothesis is 
therefore confirmed. This findings also provide more evidence to research like Axelson et al. 
(2013) who find that private equity investors pay a higher premium when debt is cheap 
(interests are low).   
 
Hypothesis 7: An acquirer pays a higher premium when the target is larger  
The variable log_size was regressed to investigate this hypothesis. For all main models with 
CAR63, CAR42, DP3 and DP63 the results are insignificant. Therefore this hypothesis cannot 
be confirmed or contradicted.  
Table 2 provides information about who is acquiring larger companies. Public strategic 
investors acquire targets which are much larger than e companies acquired by private equity 
investors. As already mentioned when the regression results were presented, all models find 
that the financial crisis in 2008 had an impact on the acquisition premium paid. The premium 
























Overview of expected and realised Signs  
This table shows the expected and realised sign of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. The expected sign 
therefore incorporates the stated hypothesis whereas the realised sign incorporates the result of the regression 
analyses. Signs in the “Realised sign” column denotd with ***, ** or *, indicate the significance level of the 
results at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Expected sign Realised sign 
Operating free cash flow + - (***) 
Market-to-book ratio - Not significant 
Tobin’s q - - (***, for DP63 **) 
Debt-to-capital ratio (Market 
value of equity) 
- + (CAR63 **, CAR42 mainly ***, DP3 
insignificant, DP63 mainly **) 
Debt-to-capital ratio (Book 
value of equity) 
- - (CAR63 **, CAR42 insignificant, DP3 
and DP63 insignificant in the main reg.) 
Level of cash + + (mostly *** in all regressions) 
EBITDA margin + - (Insignificant in main regressions, 
mainly ** in robustness checks) 
Interest rates in the economy - - (Insignificant in CAR63 and CAR42, 
mainly ** in DP3 and DP63 in 
robustness check)  













6. Concluding remarks  
6.1 Limitations of the presented research  
The first limitation of the presented research liesin the used data sample. All acquisitions 
investigated here are done with public listed companies as a target. However, obviously there 
are plenty of acquisitions done where the target is a private company. As Kaplan et al. (2009) 
estimates, of the transactions done between 1970 and 2007 by private equity firms, only 27% 
are public-to-private transactions (which are mostly used in this data sample). Additionally, as 
Officer (2007) find and Cooney, Moeller and Stegemoller (2009) acknowledges, private 
companies are valued at a discount compared to public companies (liquidity discount). This 
could mean that the results found in this work could change when using a sample of private 
acquisitions. Another limitation is that this research only investigates successful and completed 
transactions, so there is some selection bias.  
Additionally, in this research are only independent variables included which describe 
characteristics of the targets. Including characteristics from the acquirer like the size of the 
private equity fund or, for the public acquire the stakes hold in the company by the management 
(insider ownership) could possibly increase the discoveries made in this research.  However, 
due to the limited information available, which is e pecially because the data are about the 
European market, this information’s could not be included and investigated.   
6.2 Conclusion 
The research done by Bargeron et al. (2008) where ty use transactions from the United States 
to investigate the premium difference paid between public strategic investors and private equity 
investors showed clear results. Private equity investors pay a lower premium in their 
investigated data. The here presented research uses transactions where the target is located in 
Europe. The overall result is similar to the one found by Bargeron et al. (2008), private equity 
investors pay a lower premium compared to public strategic investors. More specifically, a 
target shareholder who gets and offer for its shares, g ts on average a 64.49% higher price 
(median 47.21% higher) if the offer comes from a public strategic investor compared to a 
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private equity fund (using the CAR63). The argument that the strategic acquirer can gain 
synergies and is therefore paying a higher price is not a sufficient explanation. This is due to 
the fact that I found that private strategic investor  are not paying an as high premium as public 
strategic investor do (35.51% lower on average when m asured with CAR63).  
Acquirers pay a much higher premium when the level of cash on the balance sheet is high. For 
managers who do not want to get acquired by an investor this finding makes the clear suggestion 
to keep the level of cash on the balance sheet as low as possible. A further interesting finding 
is that private equity investors are acquiring companies with a much lower TOBINS_Q than 
public strategic investor do. What is more, the EBITDA margin does not look to play a major 
role when determining the premium paid. Also, private equity investors acquire targets with a 
much higher EBITDA margin than public strategic investors do. Future research could 
investigate the reasons for this in more detail. The next section will present further avenues for 
future research.  
6.3 Avenues for further research 
Also the presented research covers multiple fields within acquisition research and reasons for 
why acquirers pay a higher premium, further research can bring even more interesting results. 
The section “6.1 Limitations of the presented research” touch already on some avenues for 
further studies. Investigating if the results are changing when one looks at private acquisitions 
instead of only public transaction could at least strengthen the here presented results but might 
also lead to new interesting findings.  
What is more, there may be variables which could be rel vant in explaining even more what 
makes an acquirer (either public or private investor) pay a lower or higher premium. It would 
also be interesting to know what makes a shareholder sell its company to a private equity fund 
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